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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Andres Alvarez appeals from orders revoking probation and denying credit
for time served as a condition of probation.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 19, 2014, the district court entered judgment against Alvarez
for battery on a correctional officer.

(#41986 R., p. 137. 1)

The district court

imposed a sentence of three years with six months determinate, which it
suspended, and it placed Alvarez on probation for three years. (#41986 R., p.
138.) The district court ordered that Alvarez serve, as a condition of probation,
180 days with credit for 120 days served (for a total of 60 days to serve).
(#41986 R., p. 139. 2)
On July 8, 2014, the state filed a motion for a bench warrant for a
probation violation alleging Alvarez had failed to attend or complete rehabilitation
classes, failed to maintain employment, failed to report for scheduled meetings
with his probation officer, moved without obtaining permission, failed to pay costs
and fees, and committed two new misdemeanor batteries. (R., pp. 9-11, 21-23.)

This is the second appeal in this case. The first appeal was in Docket Number
41986. Citations to the record from the first appeal will be designated by
reference to that docket number. Citations to the limited record prepared for this
second appeal will not be designated by a docket number. (R., p. 2 (order for
limited record).)
1

The court further ordered 60 days of jail "at the discretion of the probation
officer, without prior approval of the Court." (#41986 R., p. 139.) The record
does not indicate that any of this discretionary time was served.
2

1

Alvarez was arrested on the probation violation arrest warrant on January 21,
2015. (R., p. 44.)
Alvarez admitted violating his probation by failing to maintain full-time
employment and failing to pay ordered costs and fees. (R., p. 53.) On March 26,
2015, the district court revoked probation. (R., pp. 54-56.) In the order revoking
probation the district court granted 120 days credit for time served prior to entry
of judgment and 64 days served on the probation violation, but denied credit for
time served as a condition of probation. (R., pp. 55-56.) Alvarez filed a timely
notice of appeal from the order revoking probation. (R., pp. 58-59.)
While this appeal was pending, Alvarez filed a prose motion for credit for
time served. (R., pp. 63-66.) The district court then entered a corrected order
revoking probation granting credit for additional time served pre-judgment (127
days total 3 ) and after the arrest on the probation violation (99 days total 4 ).
(Augmentation.)

The court continued to deny credit for time served as a

condition of probation. (Augmentation.)

The record does not show why the court modified this number to grant seven
extra days of credit for pre-judgment time served. Alvarez claimed he was
released from prison on the prior charge and taken into custody on the battery
charge on October 9, 2013, which would have been 133 days prior to the
February 19, 2014 judgment. (R., p. 65.) Alvarez does not challenge the grant
of 127 days pre-judgment incarceration on this appeal, however.
3

It appears that the district court initially calculated the time served from the
service of the probation violation arrest warrant on January 21, 2015 to the entry
of the order on March 26, 2015. (R., pp. 44, 54.) The recalculation is apparently
based on crediting the time served after Alvarez's arrest on the criminal charges
underlying the probation violation, on December 17, 2014, rather than when the
arrest warrant for probation violation was formally served. (R., p. 20.)
4
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ISSUES
Alvarez states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Alvarez credit for
time he served as a condition of probation?

2.

Did the district court err in revoking Mr. Alvarez's probation?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Alvarez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Holding That He Was
Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served As A Condition Of Probation
A.

Introduction
Alvarez argues for the first time on appeal that amendments to I.C. §§ 18-

309 and 19-2603, which grant credit for time served as a condition of probation,
should be applied retroactively, making the district court's order denying him
credit for time served as a condition of probation based on law existing at the
time retroactively erroneous. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-14.) Because the law at
the time the district court revoked probation clearly did not provide for credit for
time served as a condition of probation, and the legislature did not make
application of the amendment changing that law retroactive, Alvarez has failed to
show error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasguez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous."
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).
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The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

The Legislature Did Not Make The Amendments Retroactive
At the time the district court entered its initial order revoking probation it

was clearly established that a probationer was "not entitled to credit for the time
he voluntarily surrendered to gain probation." State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608,
610, 826 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1992); see also State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67, 68, 96
P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted) ("The law in this area is well
settled. A period of incarceration that is a term and condition of probation will not
be credited to a defendant whose probation is subsequently revoked."). Thus,
the district court's order denying credit for time served was entirely consistent
with existing law.
Alvarez argues that amendments to the statutes controlling credit for time
served as a condition of probation should be applied retroactively. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 5-14. 5) This argument does not withstand analysis.
An Idaho statute "is not applied retroactively unless there is clear
legislative intent to that effect." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937-38, 318

Alvarez argues it would not be a retroactive application to apply the
amendments to the corrected order issued in response to his motion for
reconsideration. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) The state submits that applying the
amendments upon reconsideration of decisions made before the amendments
were effective is quintessential retroactive application.
5
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P.3d 918, 927-28 (2014) (internal quotes omitted).

Such clear intent may be

found either by an express statement of retroactivity or in the language of the
statute requiring retroactive application.

kl at 938,

318 P.3d at 928. "A statute is

not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its
enactment" but is retroactive if it "changes the legal effect of previous
transactions or events." Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d
636, 642 (2002). "When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of
the statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v.
Craven, 154 Idaho 661,667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and
citation omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506
(2011).
The statutory language in the amendments shows that the legislature
intended the amendments to apply at the time the court calculated time served

upon imposing judgment. The amendment to I.C. § 18-309 provides:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been
withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and
is later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered
or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original
withheld or suspended judgment.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 1, p. 240 (emphasis added). As the italicized
language indicates, under the plain language of the amendment the time the

6

statute applies is upon entry of judgment after the probation violation has been
found. Likewise, the amended LC. § 19-2603 provides:

When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a
condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 2, p. 240 (emphasis added).

Again, the

contemplated time-frame for the awarding of credit for time served is at the time
the court revoked the probation.
These amendments became effective on July 1, 2015. I.C. § 67-510. The
district court entered its order revoking probation on March 26, 2015. (R., pp. 5456.)

Because the amendments are not retroactive, they did not apply to the

district court's calculation of credit for time served.
Alvarez has failed to show that the amendments he invokes were in any
way applicable to the ruling that he was not entitled to credit for time served on
probation, which was made at the time of revocation of the probation and before
the amendments were effective. He has therefore failed to show error.

11.
Alvarez Has Failed To Show That Revoking His Probation Was An Abuse Of
Discretion
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001 )). Alvarez contends
the district court erred by revoking his probation because "[i]nitially [he] was

7

doing well."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.)

Whether this argument is true

depends heavily on the definitions of "initially" and "doing well." Moreover, the
record shows that, even if he were "initially doing well," he later was doing very
poorly.

Review of the record shows Alvarez has failed to show any abuse of

discretion.
The record shows that, after serving the jail ordered as a condition of
probation, Alvarez moved to Jerome and met with a probation officer there on
April 3, 2014. (Exhibits, p. 16. 6) By April 17, 2014, he had a job. (Exhibits, p.
17.) On April 29 probation officers attempting to contact him at his home learned
he had moved.

(Exhibits, p. 18.)

On May 1 his probation officer confirmed

Alvarez had enrolled in MRT (Moral Recognition Therapy). (Exhibits, p. 18.) On
May 27 Alvarez was found in the company of a felon. (Exhibits, pp. 19-20.) On
June 4 Alvarez failed to appear for a meeting with his probation officer. (Exhibits,
p. 21; R., p. 13.)

Alvarez missed MRT on May 29 and June 5, and was

terminated from the program. (Exhibits, pp. 20-21; R., p. 12.) On June 20 the
probation officer learned Alvarez failed to show up for work starting on June 11
and was fired. (Exhibits, p. 22; R., p. 13.) On June 23 Alvarez missed his "make
up contact day" with his probation officer. (Exhibits, p. 23; R., p. 13.) Alvarez's
last contact with his probation officer was July 21. (Exhibits p. 24; see also R., p.

Citations to the "Exhibits" are to the electronic file of the probation documents
and police reports submitted by the prosecution, titled "ALVAREZ 43094 psi
add.pdf." Alvarez refers to these exhibits as an APSI in his brief. The state
believes "Exhibits" is a more accurate description.
6
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13 (Alvarez absconded probation).) On December 17, 2014, Alvarez assaulted
other people with a knife during a fight and was arrested. (Exhibits, pp. 3-4, 24.)
The record does not show that Alvarez was "initially ... doing well."
Rather, it shows he minimally complied for a few weeks. He had a job from April
17 to June 11, which he lost because he did not show up. He was in the required
rehabilitation therapy from May 1 until he quit attending on May 29. Although on
appeal he claims he was paying restitution (Appellant's brief, p. 15), the record
shows only that he agreed to start paying restitution in October (Exhibits, p. 18),
and does not show any payments being actually made (R., p. 18). Alvarez's
claim he had "turned a corner" (Appellant's brief, p. 16) is dubious, because the
record shows he had been on probation for only about two months before
absconding, held a job for only about seven weeks before being fired for not
showing up, and was in rehabilitation treatment for less than a month before he
quit.

Moreover, the record shows that Alvarez completely absconded from

probation and was doing nothing to rehabilitate for several months before his
arrest on additional criminal charges. The district court's conclusion that Alvarez
had "not been a good probationer" (Tr., p. 15, L. 16) is amply supported by the
record.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
orders revoking probation and not granting credit for time served as a condition
of probation.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of November, 2015, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/dd
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